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Abstract
We study a school choice problem under affirmative action policies where authorities re-
serve a certain fraction of the slots at each school for specific student groups, and where
students have preferences not only over the schools they are matched to but also the type of
slots they receive. Such reservation policies might cause waste in instances of low demand from
some student groups. To propose a solution to this issue, we construct a family of choice func-
tions, dynamic reserves choice functions, for schools that respect within-group fairness and
allow the transfer of otherwise vacant slots from low-demand groups to high-demand groups.
We propose the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) as an allocation rule where each school
uses a dynamic reserves choice function and show that it is stable with respect to schools’
choice functions, is strategy-proof, and respects improvements. Furthermore, we show that
transferring more of the otherwise vacant slots leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement
under the COM.
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1 Introduction
The theory of two-sided matching and its applications has been studied since the seminal work
of Gale and Shapley (1962). Nevertheless, many real-life matching markets are subject to various
constraints, such as affirmative action in school choice. Economists and policy makers are often
faced with new challenges from such constraints. Admission policies in school choice systems often
use reserves to grant applicants from certain backgrounds higher priority for some available slots.
Reservation in India is such a process of setting aside a certain percentage of slots in government
institutions for members of underrepresented communities, defined primarily by castes and tribes.
We present engineering school admissions in India as an unprecedented matching problem with
affirmative action in which students care about the category through which they are admitted.
In engineering school admissions in India, students from different backgrounds (namely, sched-
uled castes (SC), scheduled tribes (ST), other backward classes (OBC), and general category (GC))1
are treated with different criteria. Schools reserve a certain fraction of their slots for students from
SC, ST, and OBC categories. The remaining slots at each school, which are called general category
(GC) slots, are open to competition. It is optional for SC, ST, and OBC students to declare their
background information. Those who do declare their background information are considered for
the reserved slots in their respective category, as well as for the GC slots. Students who do not
belong to SC, ST, or OBC categories are considered only for GC slots. Students belonging to
SC, ST, and OBC communities who do not reveal their background information are only consid-
ered for GC slots. Aygün and Turhan (2017) documented that students from SC, ST, and OBC
categories have preferences not only for schools but also for the category through which they are
admitted. Hence, students from these communities may prefer not to declare their caste and tribe
information in the application process. Besides this strategic calculation burden on students, the
current admission procedure2 suffers from a crucial market failure: The assignment procedure fails
to transfer some unfilled slots reserved for under-privileged castes and tribes to the use of remaining
students. Hence, it is quite wasteful.
We address real-life applications as follows: There are schools and students to be matched.
Each school initially reserves a certain number of its slots for different privilege groups (or student
types). A given student may possibly match with a given school under more than one type. Each
school has a pre-specified sequence3 in which different sets of slots are considered, and where each
set accepts students in a single privilege type. Different schools might have different orders. Since
a student might have more than one privilege type, the set of students cannot be partitioned into
1Students who do not belong to SC, ST, and OBC categories are called general category (GC) applicants.
2Admission to the Indian Institute of Technologies (IITs) and its matching-theoretical shortcomings are explained
in detail in Aygün and Turhan (2017).
3We will call this sequence a precedence sequence, which is different than the precedence order from Kominers
and Sönmez (2016). Precedence order is a linear order over the set of student types. Precedence sequence, on
the other hand, is more general in the sense that a given student type might appear multiple times. A technical
definition will be given in the model section.
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privilege groups. Each student has a preference over school-privilege type pairs. Students care
not only about which school they are matched to but also about the privilege type under which
they are admitted. Each school has a target distribution of its slots over privilege types, but they
do not consider these target distributions as hard bounds4. If there is less demand from at least
one privilege type, schools are given the opportunity to utilize vacant slots by transferring them
over to other privilege types. Authorities might require a certain capacity transfer scheme so that
each school has a complete plan where they state how they want to redistribute these slots. Thus,
we take capacity transfer schemes exogenously given. The only mild condition imposed on the
capacity transfer scheme is monotonicity,5 which requires that (1) if more slots are left from one
or more sets, the capacity of the sets considered later in the precedence sequence must be weakly
higher, and (2) a school cannot decrease the total capacity in response to increased demand for
some sets of slots.
We design choice functions for schools that allow them to transfer capacities from low-demand
privilege types to high-demand privilege types. Each school respects an exogenously given prece-
dence sequence between different sets of slots when it fills its slots. Each school has a strict priority
ordering (possibly different than the other schools’) over all students. For each school, priority
orderings for different privilege types are straightforwardly derived from the school’s priority or-
dering. There is an associated choice function, which we call a “sub-choice function,” for each set
of slots. In Indian engineering school admissions, sub-choice functions are q-responsive. That is, a
sub-choice function always selects the q-best students with respect to the priority ordering of the
associated privilege type at that school, where q denotes the capacity.
The school starts filling its first set of slots according to its precedence sequence. Given the
initial capacity of the first set of slots and a contract set, the sub-choice function associated with
the first set selects contracts. The school then moves to the second set according to its precedence
sequence. The (dynamic) capacity of the second set is a function of the number of unfilled slots
in the first set. The exogenous capacity transfer function of the school specifies the capacity of
the second set. The set of available contracts for the second set of slots is computed as follows:
If a student has one of her contracts chosen by the first set, then all of her contracts are removed
for the rest of the choice process. Given the set of remaining contracts and the capacity, the
sub-choice function associated with the second set selects contracts. In general, the (dynamic)
capacity of set k is a function of the number of vacant slots of the k − 1 sets that precede it.
The set of contracts available to the set of slots k is computed as follows: If a student has one
of her contracts chosen by one of the k − 1 sets of slots that precede the kth set, then all of her
contracts are removed. Given the set of remaining contracts for the set of slots k and its capacity,
the sub-choice function associated with the set k selects contracts. The (overall) choice of a school
is the union of sub-choices of its sets of slots.
4Hard bounds and soft bounds are analyzed in detail in Hafalır et al. (2013) and Ehlers et al. (2014).
5Westkamp (2013) introduces this monotonicity condition on capacity transfer schemes.
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We propose a remedy for the Indian engineering school admissions problem through a matching
with contracts model that has the ability to utilize vacant slots of certain types for other students.
We have three design objectives: stability, strategy-proofness and respect for improvements. Sta-
bility ensures that (1) no student is matched with an unacceptable school-slot category pair, (2)
schools’ dynamic reserves choices are respected, and (3) no student desires a slot at which she has
a justified claim under the priority and precedence structure. Strategy-proofness guarantees that
students can never game the allocation mechanism via preference manipulation. In our frame-
work, it also relieves students of the strategic manipulation burden, which involves whether or not
students declare their background.6 Respect for improvements7 is an essential property in merito-
cratic systems. In allocation mechanisms that respect improvements, students have no incentive
to lower their standings in schools’ priority rankings.
We propose the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) as an allocation rule. We prove that the
COM is stable with respect to schools’ dynamic reserve choice functions (Theorem 1), is (weakly)
group strategy-proof (Theorem 2), and respects improvements (Theorem 3). The main result of
the paper (Theorem 4) states that when a single school’s choice function becomes “more flexible,”8
while those of the other schools remain unchanged, the outcome of the COM under the former
(weakly) Pareto dominates the outcome under the latter. Theorem 4 is of particular importance
because it describes a strategy-proof Pareto improvement. Finally, we investigate the relationship
between families of dynamic reserves choice rules and Kominers and Sönmez’s (2016) slot-specific
priorities choice rules. We show that for every slot-specific priorities choice rule, there is an outcome
equivalent dynamic reserves choice rule (Theorem 5). Moreover, we give an example of a dynamic
reserves choice rule for which there is no outcome equivalent slot-specific priorities choice rule
(Example 1).
Related Literature
The school choice problem was first introduced by the seminal paper of Abdulkadiroğlu and Sön-
mez (2003). The authors introduced a simple affirmative action policy with type-specific quotas.
Kojima (2012) showed that the minority students who purported to be the beneficiaries might in-
stead be made worse off under this type of affirmative action. To circumvent inefficiencies caused
by majority quotas, Hafalır et al. (2013) offer minority reserves. Westkamp (2013) introduced a
model of matching with complex constraints. His model permits priorities to vary across slots.
In his model, students are considered to be indifferent between different slots of a given school.
6Strategy-proofness ensures that it is a weakly dominant strategy for each student to report their caste and tribe
information.
7See Kominers (2019) for detailed discussion of respect for improvements in matching markets.
8We define “more flexible” criterion to compare two monotonic capacity transfer schemes given a precedence
sequence. We say that a monotonic capacity transfer scheme q˜ is more flexible than monotonic capacity transfer
scheme q if q˜ transfers at least as many otherwise vacant slots as q at every instance. There must also be an instance
where q˜ transfers strictly more otherwise vacant slots than q does.
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However, in our framework, students have strict preferences for type-specific matches with schools.
This crucial aspect differentiates our paper from Westkamp (2013). Moreover, our comparative
statics result on transfer schemes does not have a counterpart in Westkamp (2013).
Kominers and Sönmez (2016) introduce another prominent family of choice functions—slot-
specific priorities choice functions—to implement diversity objectives in many-to-one settings. We
show that dynamic reserves choice rules nest slot-specific priorities choice rules. Moreover, we
provide an example of a dynamic reserves choice rule that cannot be generated by a slot-specific
priorities choice rule.
In a related work, Biró et al. (2010) analyze a college admission model with common and upper
quotas in the context of Hungarian college admissions. They use choice functions for colleges that
allow them to select multiple contracts of the same applicant. They show that a stable assignment
exists. The completions of dynamic reserves choice functions, discussed in Appendix 7.2, satisfy
the properties they impose. Hence, their result also implies the existence of a stable allocation
in our framework. However, our main focus is different as we aim to show strategy-proof Pareto
improvement by making capacity transfer function more flexible.
The matching problem with dynamic reserves choice functions is a special case of the matching
with contracts model of Fleiner (2003)9 and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).10 The analysis and
results of Hatfield and Kominers (2019) are the technical backbone of our results regarding stable
and strategy-proof mechanism design. We show that every dynamic reserves choice function has
a completion that satisfies the irrelevance of rejected contracts condition of Aygün and Sönmez
(2013), in conjunction with substitutability and the law of aggregate demand.
Hatfield et al. (2017) introduce a model of hospital choice in which each hospital has a set of
divisions and flexible allotment of capacities to those divisions that vary as a function of the set
of contracts available. These authors define choice functions that nest dynamic reserves choice
functions while continuing to obtain stability and strategy-proofness for the COM. Our Theorems
3 and 4 do not have a counterpart in Hatfield et al. (2017).
Our work is also related with the research agenda on matching with constraints that is studied
in a series of papers: Kamada and Kojima (2015), (2017), Kojima et al. (2018), and Goto et al.
(2017). In these papers, constraints are imposed on subsets of institutions as a joint restriction,
as opposed to at each individual institution. Our main results distinguish our work from these
papers. We discuss the relationship between our stability notion and that of Kamada and Kojima
(2017) in Section 3.
Another related paper is Echenique and Yenmez (2015). Dynamic reserves choice functions
might seem similar to the family of choice functions the authors analyze: choice rules generated
9Fleiner’s results cover these of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) regarding stability. However, Fleiner (2003) does
not analyze incentives.
10Echenique (2012) has shown that under the substitutes condition, which is thoroughly assumed in Hatfield and
Milgrom (2005), the matching with contracts model can be embedded within the Kelso and Crawford (1982) labor
market model. Kelso and Crawford (1982) built on the analysis of Crawford and Knoer (1981).
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by reserves. However, dynamic reserves choice functions choose contracts whereas choice rules
generated by reserves choose students.
Two recent papers, Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a,b), study affirmative action in India from a
matching-theoretical perspective. The authors consider both vertical and horizontal reservations11
while we consider only vertical reservations for simplicity. Even though they consider more general
reserve structure than ours, the authors consider agents’ preferences only over institutions and
do not take agents’ preferences over vertical categories they are admitted under into account.
Moreover, they assume away capacity transfers between vertical categories. Therefore, their model
does not contain our model and vice versa.
2 Model
There is a finite set of students I = {i1, ..., in}, a finite set of schools S = {s1, ..., sm}, and a
finite set of student privileges (types)12 T = {t1, ..., tp}. We call Ti ⊆ T the set of privileges
that student i can claim and T = (Ti)i∈I the profile of types that students can claim. We define
Xi = {i}×S×Ti as the set of all contracts associated with student i ∈ I. We let X = ∪
i∈I
Xi be the
set of all contracts. Each contract x ∈ X is between a student i(x) and a school s(x) and specifies
a privilege t(x) ∈ Ti(x). There may be many contracts for each student-school pair. We extend
the notations i(·), s(·) and t(·) to the set of contracts for any Y ⊆ X by setting i(Y ) ≡ ∪
y∈Y
{i(y)},
s(Y ) ≡ ∪
y∈Y
{s(y)} and t(Y ) ≡ ∪
y∈Y
{t(y)}. For Y ⊆ X, we denote Yi ≡ {y ∈ Y | i(y) = i};
analogously, we denote Ys ≡ {y ∈ Y | s(y) = s} and Yt ≡ {y ∈ Y | t(y) = t}.
Each student i ∈ I has a (linear) preference order P i over contracts in Xi = {x ∈ X |
i(x) = i} and an outside option ∅ which represents remaining unmatched. A contract x ∈ Xi is
acceptable for i (with respect to P i) if xP i∅. We use the convention that ∅P ix if x ∈ X \ Xi.
We say that the contracts x ∈ X for which ∅P ix are unacceptable to i . The at-least-as-well
relation Ri is obtained from P i as follows: xRix
′
if and only if either xP ix
′
or x = x
′
. Let P i
denote the set of all preferences over Xi ∪ {∅}. A preference profile of students is denoted by
P = (P i1, ..., P in) ∈ ×i∈IP
i. A preference profile of all students except student il is denoted by
P−il = (P
i1, ..., P il−1, P il+1, ..., P in) ∈ ×i 6=ilP
i.
Students have unit demand, that is, they choose at most one contract from a set of contract
offers. We assume that students always choose the best available contract, so that the choice C i(Y )
of a student i ∈ I from contract set Y ⊆ X is the P i-maximal element of Y (or the outside option
if ∅P iy for all y ∈ Y ).13
11Caste-based reservations for SC, ST, and OBC categories are called vertical reservations, also referred to as social
reservations. Horizontal reservations, also referred to as special reservations, are intended for other disadvantaged
groups of citizens, such as disabled persons, and women. Horizontal reservations are implemented within each
vertical category. See Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a,b) for details.
12We use the terms “type” and “privilege” interchangeably.
13To simplify our notation, the individual contracts are treated as interchangeable with singleton contract sets.
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For each school s ∈ S, qs denotes the physical capacity of school s ∈ S. We call q = (qs1..., qsm)
the vector of school capacities. Each school s ∈ S has a priority order πs, which is a linear order
over I ∪ {∅}.14 Let Π = (πs1, ..., πsm) denote the priority profile of schools. For each school s ∈ S,
the priority ordering for students who can claim the privilege t ∈ T , denoted by πst , is obtained
from πs as follows:
• for i, j ∈ I such that t ∈ Ti \ Tj , iπ
s∅, and jπs∅, iπst ∅π
s
t j,
15
• for any other i, j ∈ I, iπst j if and only if iπ
sj.
An allocation Y ⊆ X is a set of contracts such that each student appears in at most one contract
and no school appears in more contracts than its capacity allows. Let X denote the set of all
allocations. Given a student i and an allocation Y , we refer to the pair (s(x), t(x)) such that
i(x) = i as the assignment of student i under allocation Y . We extend student preferences over
contracts to preferences over outcomes in the natural way. We say that an allocation Y ⊆ X
Pareto dominates allocation Z ⊆ X if YiR
iZi for all i ∈ I and YiP
iZi for at least one i ∈ I.
2.1 Dynamic Reserves Choice Functions
Each school s ∈ S has multi-unit demand, and is endowed with a choice function Cs(·) that
describes how s would choose from any offered set of contracts. Throughout the paper, we assume
that for all Y ⊆ X and for all s ∈ S, the choice function Cs(·):
1. only selects contracts to which s is a party, i.e., Cs(Y ) ⊆ Ys, and
2. selects at most one contract with any given student.
For any Y ⊆ X and s ∈ S, we denote Rs(Y ) ≡ Y \ Cs(Y ) as the set of contracts that s rejects
from Y .
We now introduce a model of dynamic reserves choice functions in which each school s ∈ S has
λs groups of slots. School s fills its groups of slots according to a precedence sequence,
16 which is
a surjective function f s : {1, ..., λs} −→ T . The interpretation of f
s is that school s fills the first
group of slots with f s(1)-type students, the second group of slots with f s(2)-type students, and
so on. School s ∈ S has a target distribution of its slots across different types (qt1s , ..., q
tp
s ), which
means that it has qt1s slots to be reserved for privilege t1, q
t2
s slots to be reserved for privilege t2,
14This priority order is often determined by performance on an admission exam, by a random lottery, or dictated
by law. In engineering school admissions in India, each school ranks students according to test scores. Different
schools might have different test score rankings because they use different weighted averages of math, physics,
chemistry, and biology scores depending on the school. It is important to note that students whose test scores are
under a certain threshold are deemed as unacceptable for each school.
15∅pist j means student j is unacceptable for privilege t at school s.
16We take precedence sequences to be exogenously given. However, Dur et al. (2018) show that precedence
sequences might have significant effects on distributional objectives in the context of Boston’s school choice system.
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and so on. To satisfy its target reserve structure, school s fills its slots according to the initially
set capacities for each group of slots (q1s, q
2
s, ..., q
λs
s ) such that
∑
j∈(fs)−1(t)
qjs = q
t
s for all t ∈ T . If the
target distribution cannot be achieved because too few students from one or more privileges apply,
then school s use an exogenously given capacity transfer scheme that specifies how its capacity is
to be redistributed. Technically, a capacity transfer scheme is defined as follows:
Definition 1. Given a precedence sequence f s and a capacity of the first group of slots q1s, a
capacity transfer scheme of school s is a sequence of capacity functions qs = (q
1
s, (q
k
s )
λs
k=2),
where qks : Z
k−1
+ −→ Z+ such that q
k
s (0, ..., 0) = q
k
s for all k ∈ {2, ..., λs}.
We impose a mild condition, à la Westkamp (2013), on capacity transfer functions.
Definition 2. A capacity transfer scheme qs is monotonic if, for all j ∈ {2, ..., λs} and all pairs
of sequences (rl, r˜l) such that r˜l ≥ rl for all l ≤ j − 1,
• qjs(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1) ≥ q
j
s(r1, ..., rj−1), and
•
j∑
m=2
[qms (r˜1, ..., r˜m−1)− q
m
s (r1, ..., rm−1)] ≤
j−1∑
m=1
[r˜m − rm].
Monotonicity of capacity transfer schemes requires that (1) whenever weakly more slots are left
unfilled in every groups of slots preceding the jth group of slots, weakly more slots should be
available for the jth group, and (2) a school cannot decrease its total capacity in response to
increased demand for some groups of slots.
Sub-choice functions
For each group of slots at school s ∈ S, there is an associated sub-choice function cs : 2X × Z+ ×
T −→ 2X . Given a set of contracts Y ⊆ X, a nonnegative integer κ ∈ Z+, and a privilege t ∈ T ,
cs(Y, κ, t) denotes the set of chosen contracts that name privilege t up to the capacity κ from the
set of contracts Y . We require sub-choice functions to be q-responsive given the ranking πst .
Definition 3. 17A sub-choice function cs(·, κ, t) of a group of slots at school s for privilege type t
is q-responsive if there exists a strict priority ordering πst on the set of contracts naming privilege
type t and a positive integer κ, such that for any Y ⊆ (Xs ∩Xt),
cs(Y, κ, t) =
κ
∪
i=1
{y∗i }
where y∗i is defined as y
∗
1 = max
pist
Y and, for 2 ≤ i ≤ κ, y∗i = max
pist
Y \ {y∗1, ..., y
∗
i−1} .
17We adapt this definition from Chambers and Yenmez (2017).
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In other words, a sub-choice function is q-responsive18 if there is a strict priority ordering over
students who have privilege t for which the sub-choice function always selects the highest-ranked
available students in privilege t up to the capacity.
Remark 1. Since our main real-life application is engineering school admissions in India, we shall
assume that at each school s ∈ S, and for each group of slots reserved for privilege t ∈ T , the
associated sub-choice function cs(·, ·, t) is q-responsive and obtained from πst .
Overall choice functions
The overall choice function of school s, Cs(·, f s, qs) : 2
X −→ 2X , runs its sub-choice functions
in an orderly fashion given the precedence sequence f s and capacity transfer scheme qs. Given a
set of contracts Y ⊆ X, Cs(Y, f s, qs) denotes the set of chosen contracts from the set of contracts
Y and is determined as follows:
• Given q1s and Y = Y
0 ⊆ X, let Y1 ≡ c
s
1(Y
0, q1s, f
s(1)) be the set of chosen contracts with
privilege f s(1) from Y 0. Let r1 = q
1
s− | Y1 | be the number of vacant slots. Define Y˜1 ≡
{y ∈ Y 0 | i(y) ∈ i(Y1)} as the set of all contracts of students whose contracts are chosen
by sub-choice function cs1(·, q
1
s, f
s(1)). If a contract of a student is chosen, then all of the
contracts naming that student shall be removed from the set of available contracts for the
rest of the procedure. The set of remaining contracts is then Y 1 = Y 0 \ Y˜1.
• In general, let Yk = c
s
k(Y
k−1, qks , f
s(k)) be the set of chosen contracts with privilege f s(k)
from the set of available contracts Y k−1 , where qks = q
k
s (r1, ..., rk−1) is the dynamic capacity
of group of slots k as a function of the vector of the number of unfilled slots (r1, ..., rk−1).
Let rk = q
k
s− | Yk | be the number of vacant slots. Define Y˜k = {y ∈ Y
k−1 | i(y) ∈ i(Yk)}.
The set of remaining contracts is then Y k = Y k−1 \ Y˜k.
• Given Y = Y 0 ⊆ X and the capacity of the first group of slots q1s , we define the overall choice
function of school s as Cs(Y, f s, qs) = c
s
1(Y
0, q1s, f
s(1))∪ (
λs
∪
k=2
csk(Y
k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(k))).
The primitives of the overall choices for each school s ∈ S are the precedence sequence f s, the capac-
ity transfer scheme qs, and the priority order π
s. Since an overall choice is computed by using these
primitives, it is not one of the primitives in our model. The list (I, S,T, X, P,Π, (f s, qs, π
s)s∈S)
denotes a problem.
18These types of sub-choice functions are often used in real-life applications. For example, in the cadet branch
matching processes in the USMA and ROTC, each sub-choice function is induced from a strict ranking of students
according to test scores. See Sönmez and Switzer (2013) and Sönmez (2013) for further details.
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3 Stability Concept
Stability has emerged as the key to a successful matching market design. We follow the Gale and
Shapley (1962) tradition in focusing on outcomes that are stable. In the matching with contracts
framework, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) define stability as follows: An outcome Y ⊆ X is stable
if
1. YiR
i∅ for all i ∈ I,
2. Cs(Y ) = Ys for all s ∈ S, and
3. there does not exist a school s ∈ S and a blocking set Z 6= Cs(Y ) such that Zs ⊆ C
s(Y ∪Z)
and Zi = C
i(Y ∪ Z) for all i∈ i(Z).
If the first requirement (individual rationality for students) fails, then there is a student who
prefers to reject a contract that involves her (or, equivalently, there is a student who is given an
unacceptable contract). In our context, the second condition (individual rationality for schools)
requires that the schools’ choice functions are respected. If the third condition (unblockedness)
fails, then there is an alternative set of contracts that a school and students associated with a
contract in that set strictly prefers.
Remark 2. Our stability notion is related to the weak stability notion of Kamada and Kojima
(2017). The authors define the feasibility constraint as a map φ : Z|H|+ −→ {0, 1}, such that
φ(w) ≥ φ(w
′
) whenever w ≤ w
′
. Their interpretation is that each coordinate in w corresponds to
a hospital and the number in that coordinate represents the number of doctors matched to that
hospital. φ(w) = 1 means that w is feasible and φ(w) = 0 means it is not. They say that matching
µ is feasible if and only if φ(w(µ)) = 1, where w(µ) := (| µh |)h∈H is a vector of nonnegative integers
indexed by hospitals whose coordinates corresponding to h are | µh |. Capacity transfer functions
in our setting can be represented by the feasibility constraint map from their paper. Condition 2
in our stability definition takes into account not only dynamic capacities of groups of seats in each
school but also their precedence sequences. It is a feasibility condition. Westkamp (2013) defines
a similar condition in his “procedural stability” definition in a simpler matching model without
contracts.
4 The Cumulative Offer Mechanism and its Properties under
Dynamic Reserves Choice Functions
A direct mechanism is a mechanism where the strategy space is the set of preferences P for each
student i ∈ I, i.e., a function ψ : Pn −→ X that selects an allocation for each preference profile.
We propose the COM as our allocation function. Given the student preferences and schools’ overall
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choice functions, the outcome of the COM is computed by the cumulative offer algorithm. This
is the generalization of the agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley
(1962). We now introduce the cumulative offer process (COP)19 for matching with contracts.
Here, we provide an intuitive description of this algorithm; we give a more technical description in
Appendix 7.1.
Definition 4. In the COP, students propose contracts to schools in a sequence of steps l = 1, 2 . . .
:
Step 1 : Some student i1 ∈ I proposes his most-preferred contract, x1 ∈ Xi1 . School s (x
1)
holds x1 if x1 ∈ Cs(x
1) ({x1}), and rejects x1 otherwise. Set A2
s(x1) = {x
1}, and set A2s′ = ∅ for each
s′ 6= s (x1); these are the sets of contracts available to schools at the beginning of Step 2.
Step 2 : Some student i2 ∈ I, for whom no school currently holds a contract, proposes his
most-preferred contact that has not yet been rejected, x2 ∈ Xi2 . School s (x
2) holds the contract
in Cs(x
2)
(
A2
s(x2) ∪ {x
2}
)
and rejects all other contracts in A2
s(x2)∪{x
2}; schools s′ 6= s (x2) continue
to hold all contracts they held at the end of Step 1. Set A3
s(x2) = A
2
s(x2) ∪ {x
2}, and set A3s′ = A
2
s′
for each s′ 6= s (x2).
Step l : Some student il ∈ I, for whom no school currently holds a contract, proposes his
most-preferred contact that has not yet been rejected, xl ∈ Xil. School s
(
xl
)
holds the contract in
Cs(x
l)
(
Al
s(xl)
∪
{
xl
})
and rejects all other contracts in Al
s(xl)
∪
{
xl
}
; schools s′ 6= s
(
xl
)
continue
to hold all contracts they held at the end of Step l−1. Set Al+1
s(xl)
= Al
s(xl)
∪
{
xl
}
, and set Al+1s′ = A
l
s′
for each s′ 6= s
(
xl
)
.
If at any time no student is able to propose a new contract—that is, if all students for whom
no contracts are on hold have proposed all contract they find acceptable—then the algorithm
terminates. The outcome of the COP is the set of contracts held by schools at the end of the last
step before termination.
In the COP, students propose contracts sequentially. Schools accumulate offers, choosing at
each step (according to their choice functions) a set of contracts to hold from the set of all previous
offers. The process terminates when no student wishes to propose a contract.
Given a preference profile of students P = (Pi)i∈I and a profile of choice functions for schools
C = (Cs)s∈S, let Φ (P,C) denote the outcome of the COM. Let Φi (P,C) denote the assignment
of student i ∈ I and Φs (P,C) denote the assignment of school s ∈ S.
Remark 3. We do not explicitly specify the order in which students make proposals. Hirata and
Kasuya (2014) show that in the matching with contracts model, the outcome of the COP is order-
independent if the overall choice function of every school satisfies the bilateral substitutability
(BLS) and the irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) conditions. Dynamic reserves choice functions
satisfy BLS and IRC. Hence, the order-independence of the COP holds.
19See Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) for more details.
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A mechanism ϕ is stable if for every preference profile P ∈ P |I| the outcome ϕ (P ) is stable with
respect to the schools’ overall choice functions. Since the COP gives a stable outcome for every
input if each school’s capacity transfer scheme is monotonic, the COM is a stable mechanism.
Theorem 1. The cumulative offer mechanism is stable with respect to dynamic reserves choice
functions.
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
To analyze the incentive properties of the COM when schools use dynamic reserves choice func-
tions, we first define standard strategy-proofness and (weak) group strategy-proofness in relation
to a direct mechanism.
Definition 5. A direct mechanism ϕ is said to be strategy-proof if there does not exist a
preference profile P , a student i ∈ I, and preferences P ′i of student i such that
ϕi (P
′
i , P−i)Piϕi (P ) .
That is, no matter which student we consider, no matter what her true preferences Pi are,
no matter what other preferences P−i other students report (true or not), and no matter which
potential “misrepresentation” P ′i student i considers, a truthful preference revelation is in her best
interest. Hence, students can never benefit from gaming the mechanism ϕ.
Definition 6. A direct mechanism ϕ is said to be weakly group strategy-proof if there is no
preference profile P , a subset of students I ′ ⊆ I, and a preference profile (Pi)i∈I′ of students in I
′
such that
ϕi
(
(P ′i )i∈I′ , (Pj)j∈I\I′
)
Piϕi (P )
for all i ∈ I ′.
That is, no subset of students can jointly misreport their preferences to receive a strictly
preferred outcome for every member of the coalition.
Hatfield and Kominers (2019) show that if schools’ choice functions have substitutable comple-
tions so that these completions satisfy the LAD, then the COP becomes weakly group strategy-
proof.
Theorem 2. Suppose that each school uses a dynamic reserves choice function. Then, the cumu-
lative offer mechanism is weakly group strategy-proof.
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
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Respect for Unambiguous Improvements
We say that priority profile Π is an unambiguous improvement over priority profile Π for student
i ∈ I if, for all schools s ∈ S, the following conditions hold:
1. For all x ∈ Xi and y ∈
(
XI\{i} ∪ {∅}
)
, if xπsy then xπsy.
2. For all y, z ∈ XI\{i}, yπ
sz if and only if yπsz.
That is, Π is an unambiguous improvement over priority profile Π for student i if Π is obtained
from Π by increasing the priority of some of i’s contracts while leaving the relative priority of other
students’ contracts unchanged.
Definition 7. A mechanism ϕ respects unambiguous improvements for i ∈ I if for any
preference profile P ∈ ×i∈IP
i
ϕi(P ; Π)R
iϕi(P ; Π)
whenever Π is an unambiguous improvement over Π for i. We say that ϕ respects unambiguous
improvements if it respects unambiguous improvements for each student i ∈ I.
Respect for improvements is essential in settings like ours where it implies that students never
want to intentionally decrease their test scores and, in turn, their rankings. Similarly, it is also
important in cadet-branch matching where cadets can influence their priority rankings directly.
Sönmez (2013) argues that cadets take perverse steps to lower their priorities because the mech-
anism used by the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) to match its cadets to branches fails
the respecting improvements property.
Theorem 3. The cumulative offer mechanism with respect to dynamic reserves choice functions
respects unambiguous improvements.
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
5 Comparative Statics on Monotonic Capacity Transfer Schemes
In this section, we first define a comparison criteria between two monotone capacity transfer
schemes. Consider a school s ∈ S with a given precedence sequence f s and target distribution
qs = (q
1
s, ..., q
λs
s ). Let qs and q˜s be two monotone capacity transfer schemes: given a vector of
unused slots from group of slots 1 to j − 1, (r1, ..., rj−1) ∈ Z
j−1
+ , the dynamic capacity of the j
th
group under capacity transfer schemes qs and q˜s are q
j
s = q
j
s(r1, ..., rj−1) and q˜
j
s = q˜
j
s(r1, ..., rj−1),
respectively, for all j ≥ 2 and, q1s = q˜
1
s = q
1
s.
Let qs and q˜s be two monotone capacity transfer schemes that are compatible with the prece-
dence sequence f s and target capacity vector qs of school s ∈ S. We say that the monotone
capacity transfer scheme q˜s is more flexible than the monotone capacity transfer scheme qs if
13
1. there exists l ∈ {2, ..., λs} and (rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1) ∈ Zl−1+ such that q˜
l
s(rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1) > q
l
s(rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1),
and
2. for all j ∈ {2, ..., λs} and (r1, ..., rj−1) ∈ Z
j−1
+ , if j 6= l or (r1, ..., rj−1) 6= (rˆ, ..., rˆl−1), then
q˜js(r1, ..., rj−1) ≥ q
j
s(r1, ..., rj−1).
The definition states that one monotonic capacity transfer scheme is more flexible than another
if it transfers at least as many vacant slots as the other at every instance (i.e., the vectors of the
number of unused slots). There must also be an instance where the first one transfers strictly more
vacant slots than the second one to the next group of slots according to the precedence sequence.
Also, both of the monotonic capacity transfer schemes take the capacity of the first group of slots
with respect to the precedence sequence equal to its target capacity. Holding all else constant,
when the capacity transfer scheme becomes more flexible, it defines a particular choice function
expansion.20
Expanding the overall choice function of a single school leads to Pareto improvement for stu-
dents under the COM.21
Theorem 4. Let C = (Cs1, ..., Csm) be the profile of schools’ overall choice functions. Fix a school
s ∈ S. Suppose that C˜s takes a capacity transfer scheme that is more flexible than that of Cs,
holding all else constant. Then, the outcome of the cumulative offer mechanism with respect to
(C˜s, C−s) weakly Pareto dominates the outcome of the cumulative offer mechanism with respect to
C.
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
Theorem 4 is of particular importance because it indicates that increasing the transferability
of capacity from low-demand to high-demand groups leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement
with the cumulative offer algorithm. This result provides a normative foundation for recommending
a more flexible interpretation of type-specific quotas. This result establishes that to maximize
students’ welfare, schools’ choice functions should be expanded as much as possible.
It is important to note that when more than one school’s capacity transfer scheme become more
flexible, a simple iteration of Theorem 4, one school at a time, ensures (weak) Pareto improvement.
Therefore, a more flexible capacity transfer profile of schools implies that the COM with the new
capacity transfer scheme (weakly) Pareto improves the original transfer scheme.
20The type of choice function expansion here is different than the one Chambers and Yenmez (2017) define.
Their notion of expansion is in the sense of set inclusion while ours is not. They say that a choice function C
′
is an
expansion of another choice function C if for every offer set Y , C(Y ) ⊆ C
′
(Y ). According to the expansion via a
more flexible capacity transfer scheme, when a choice function C expands to C
′
it is possible to have C(Y ) * C
′
(Y )
for some Y .
21This result does not contradict the findings of Alva and Manjunath (2019), because increasing flexibility of the
capacity transfers changes the choice functions, and therefore the set of contracts that are feasible in their context.
Theorem 4 achieves the improvement by considering a dominating mechanism that is infeasible under the original
transfer scheme.
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6 Relationship Between Slot-specific Priorities and Dynamic
Reserves Choice Rules
In this section, we investigate the relationship between the families of slot-specific priorities choice
rules and dynamic reserves choice rules. To do so, we first describe slot-specific priorities choice
rules.
Each school s ∈ S has a set of slots Bs. Each slot can be assigned at most one contract in Xs.
Slots b ∈ Bs have linear priority orders π
b over contracts in Xs. Each slot b ranks a null contract ∅b
that represents remaining unassigned. Schools s ∈ S may be assigned as many as | Bs | contracts
from an offer set Y ⊆ X—one for each slot in Bs— but may hold no more than one contract with a
given student. The slots in Bs are ordered according to a linear order of precedence ⊲
s. We denote
Bs ≡ {b1, ..., bqs} with | Bs |= qs. The interpretation of ⊲
s is that if bl ⊲
s bl+1, then—whenever
possible—school s fills slot bl before filling slot bl+1. Formally, the choice C
s(Y ) of a school s ∈ S
from contract set Y ⊆ X is defined as follows:
• First, slot b1 is assigned the contract y1 that is π
b1-maximal among contracts in Y .
• Then, slot b2 is assigned the contract y2 that is π
b2-maximal among contracts in the set
Y \ Yi(y1) of contracts in Y with agents other than i(y1).
• This process continues in sequence, with each slot bl being assigned to the contract yl that
is πbl-maximal among contracts in the set Y \ Yi({y1,...,yl−1}).
If no contract is assigned to a slot bl ∈ Bs in the computation of C
s(Y ), then bl is assigned the
null contract ∅bl.
We first give an example of a dynamic reserves choice rule that cannot be generated by a
slot-specific priorities choice rule.
Example 1. Consider I = {i, j, k, l}, S = {s} with qs = 2, and Θ = {t1, t2, t3}. Student i only has
type t1 and a single contract x1. Student j only has type t2 and a single contract y2. Student k has
types t2 and t3, and two contracts related to these types z2 and z3, respectively. Finally, student
l has types t1 and t3, and two contracts related to these types w1 and w3, respectively. The set
of contracts for this problem is X = {x1, y2, z2, z3, w1, w3}. Students are ordered with respect to
their exam scores from highest to lowest as follows: i− j − k − l.
The school reserves the first seat for type t1, and the second seat for type t2. If either the first
seat or the second seat cannot be filled with the students they are reserved for, they are filled with
a type t3 student(s). The precedence order is such that the first seat is filled first with a type t1
student if possible, and then the second seat is filled with a type t2 student, if possible. If any of
these seats cannot be filled with the intended student types, all of the vacant seats are filled with
type t3 students at the very end, if possible.
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We can represent the distributional objective described above by capacity-transfers as follows:
Initially qt1 = qt2 = 1 and qt3 = 0. The dynamic capacity of the third seat is given by qt3 = r1+ r2,
where r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1}. Some of the choice situations under the capacity-transfer described above
are given below:
Y C(Y )
{x1, y2, z2, z3, w1, w3} {x1, y2}
{y2, z2, z3} {y2, z3}
{x1, z2, z3} {x1, z2}
{y2, w1, w3} {y2, w1}
{x1, w1, w3} {x1, w3}
{z2, z3} {z2}
{w1, w3} {w1}
In order to implement the choices above with slot-specific priorities, we need to find a strict
ranking of the contracts inX for both of the slots. Note that {x1, y2} is chosen from {x1, y2, z2, z3, w1, w2}.
Then, x1 must be chosen for one of the slots and y2 must be chosen for the other. There are two
cases to consider.
Case 1: x1 is chosen from slot 1 and y2 is chosen from slot 2. Then, x1 is the highest priority
contract in slot 1. We have C({x1, z2, z3}) = {x1, z2}. Then, z2 must have higher priority than
z3 in the strict priority ranking of slot 2 because x1 will be chosen from the first slot. Notice
that both z2 and z3 must have lower priority than y2 in the strict ranking of slot 2. Also, since
C({y2, z2, z3}) = {y2, z3}, then it must be the case that z3 has higher priority than z2 in the strict
priority of the first slot. Notice that z3 cannot be chosen from the second slot as z2 has higher
priority. However, C({z2, z3}) = {z2}. This is a contradiction.
Case 2: y2 is chosen from slot 1 and x1 is chosen from slot 2. Then, y2 has the highest priority
in slot 1. We have C({y2, w1, w3}) = {y2, w1}. Therefore, in the ranking of slot 2, w1 must have
higher priority than w3. Also, since C({x1, w1, w3}) = {x1, w3}, it follows that in the ranking of
slot 1 w3 must have higher priority than w1. This is because w3 cannot be chosen from slot 2 as
it has a lower priority than w1 there. However, C({w1, w3}) = {w1}. This is a contradiction.
Hence, we cannot find a strict rankings of the contracts in X for these two slots that generate
the dynamic reserves choice rule defined above.
Our last result states that the family of dynamic reserves choice rules nests the family of
slot-specific priorities choice rules.
Theorem 5. Every slot-specific priorities choice rule can be generated by a dynamic reserves choice
rule.
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Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies a school choice problem with distributional objectives where students care about
both the school they are matched with as well as the category through which they are admitted.
Each school can be thought of as union of different groups of slots, where each group is associated
with exactly one category. Schools have target distributions over their groups of slots in the form of
reserves. If these reserves are considered to be hard bounds, then some slots will remain empty in
instances where demand for particular categories is less than their target capacities. To overcome
this problem and to increase efficiency, we design a family of dynamic reserves choice functions.
We do so by allowing monotonic capacity transfers across groups of slots when one or more of the
groups is not able to fill to its target capacity. The capacity transfer scheme is exogenously given
for each school and governs the dynamic capacities of groups, each of which has a q-responsive
sub-choice function. The overall choice function of a school can be thought of as the union of
choices with these sub-choice functions of its groups.
We offer the COM with respect to dynamic reserves choice functions as an allocation rule.
We show that the COM is stable and strategy-proof in our framework. Moreover, the COM re-
spects improvements. We introduce a comparison criteria between two monotonic capacity transfer
schemes. If a monotone capacity transfer scheme transfers at least as many vacancies in every con-
tingency compared to another monotone capacity transfer scheme, we say that the first is more
flexible than the second. We show that when capacity transfer scheme of a school becomes more
flexible, while other school choice functions remain unchanged, the outcome of the COM under
the modified profile of choice functions Pareto dominates the outcome of the COM under the orig-
inal profile. This result is the main message of our paper, as it describes a strategy-proof Pareto
improvement by making capacity transfers more flexible.
8 APPENDICES
8.1 Formal Description of the Cumulative Offer Process
Cumulative Offer Process (COP): Consider the outcome the COM as denoted by ΦΓ (P,C).
For any preference profile P of students, profile of choice functions of schools C, and an ordering
Γ of the elements of X, the outcome is determined by the COP with respect to Γ, P and C as
follows:
Step 0: Initialize the set of contracts available to the schools as A0 = ∅.
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Step t ≥ 1: Consider the set
U t ≡
{
x ∈ X \ At−1 : i(x) /∈ i
(
CS(At−1)
)
and ∄z ∈
(
Xi(x) \A
t−1
)
∪ {∅} such that zP i(x)x
}
.
If U t is empty, then the algorithm terminates and the outcome is given by CS(At−1).22 Other-
wise, letting yt be the highest-ranked element of U t according to Γ, we say that yt is proposed and
set At = At−1 ∪ {yt} and proceed to step t+ 1.
A COP begins with no contracts available to the schools (i.e., A0 = ∅). Then, at each step t,
we construct U t, the set of contracts that (1) have not yet been proposed, (2) are not associated to
students with contracts chosen by schools from the currently available set of contracts, and (3) are
both acceptable and the most-preferred by their associated students among all contracts not yet
proposed. If U t is empty, then every student i either has some associated contract chosen by some
school, i.e., i ∈ i
(
CS(At−1)
)
, or has no acceptable contracts left to propose, and so the COP ends.
Otherwise, the contract in U t that is highest-ranked according to Γ is proposed by its associated
student, and the process proceeds to the next step. Note that at some step this process must end
as the number of contracts is finite.
Letting T denote the last step of the COP, we call AT the set of contracts observed in the COP
with respect to Γ, P , and C.
8.2 Substitutable Completion of Dynamic Reserves Choice Functions
Definition 8. A choice function Cs(·) satisfies the irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC)
condition if for all Y ⊂ X, for all z ∈ X \ Y , and z /∈ Cs (Y ∪ {z}) =⇒ Cs (Y ) = Cs (Y ∪ {z}).
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) introduce the substitutability condition, which generalizes the
earlier gross substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982).
Definition 9. A choice function Cs(·) satisfies substitutability if for all z, z′ ∈ X, and Y ⊆ X,
z /∈ Cs (Y ∪ {z}) =⇒ z /∈ Cs (Y ∪ {z, z′}).
Definition 10. A choice function Cs (·) satisfies the law of aggregate demand (LAD) if Y ⊆
Y ′ =⇒| Cs (Y ) | ≤ | Cs (Y ′) |.
The following definitions are from Hatfield and Kominers (2019). A completion of a many-to-
one choice function Cs(·) of school s ∈ S is a choice function C
s
(·), such that for all Y ⊆ X, either
C
s
(Y ) = Cs(Y ) or there exists a distinct z, z
′
∈ C
s
(Y ) such that i(z) = i(z
′
). If a choice function
Cs(·) has a completion that satisfies the substitutability and IRC condition, then we say that Cs(·)
is substitutably completable. If every choice function in a profile C = (Cs(·))s∈S is substitutably
completable, then we say that C is substitutably completable.
22We denote by CS(Y ) ≡ ∪s∈SCs(Y ) the set of contracts chosen by the set of schools from a set of contracts
Y ⊆ X .
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Let Cs(·, f s, qs) be a dynamic reserve choice function given the precedence sequence f
s and
the capacity transfer scheme qs. We define a related choice function C
s
(·, f s, qs). Given a set of
contracts Y ⊆ X, C
s
(Y, f s, qs) denotes the set of chosen contracts from set Y and is determined
as follows:
• Given q1s and Y = Y
0 ⊆ X, let Y1 ≡ c
s
1(Y
0, q1s, f
s(1)) be the set of chosen contracts with
privilege f s(1) from Y 0. Let r1 = q
1
s− | Y1 | be the number of vacant slots. The set of
remaining contracts is then Y 1 = Y 0 \ Y1.
• In general, let Yk = c
s
k(Y
k−1, qks , f
s(k)) be the set of chosen contracts with privilege f s(k)
from the set of available contracts Y k−1 , where qks = q
k
s (r1, ..., rk−1) is the dynamic capacity
of group of slots k as a function of the vector of the number of unfilled slots (r1, ..., rk−1).
Let rk = q
k
s− | Yk | be the number of vacant slots. The set of remaining contracts is then
Y k = Y k−1 \ Yk−1.
• Given Y = Y 0 ⊆ X and the capacity of the first group of slots q1s , we define C
s
(Y, f s, qs) =
cs1(Y
0, q1s, f
s(1)) ∪ (
λs
∪
k=2
csk(Y
k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(k))).
The difference between Cs(·) and C
s
(·) is as follows: In the computation of Cs(·), if a contract of
a student is chosen by some group of slots then his/her other contracts are removed for the rest of
the choice procedure. However, in the computation of C
s
(·) this is not the case. According to the
choice procedure C
s
(·), if a contract of a student is chosen, say, by group of slots k, then his/her
other contracts will still be available for the following groups of slots.
The following proposition shows that C
s
(·) defined above is the completion of the dynamic
reserves choice function Cs(·).
Proposition 1. C
s
(·) is a completion of Cs(·).
Proof. Let f s and qs be the precedence sequence and capacity transfer scheme of school s ∈ S,
respectively. Take an offer set Y = Y 0 ⊆ X and assume there is no pair of contracts z, z
′
∈ Y 0
such that i(z) = i(z
′
) and z, z
′
∈ C
s
(Y, f s, qs). We want to show that
C
s
(Y, f s, qs) = C
s(Y, f s, qs).
Let Yj be the set of contracts chosen by group of slots j and let Y
j be the set of contracts
that remains in the choice procedure after group j selects according to dynamic reserve choice
function C(·). Similarly, let Y j be the set of contracts chosen by group of slots j and let Y
j
be the set of contracts that remains in the choice procedure after group j selects according to
the completion C(·). Notice that Y 0 = Y
0
. Let rj and rj be the number of vacant slots in
group of slots j in the choice procedures Cs(Y, f s, qs) and C
s
(Y, f s, qs), respectively. Also, let
19
qjs(r1, ..., rj−1) and q
j
s(r1, ..., rj−1) denote the dynamic capacities of group of slots j under choice
procedures Cs(Y, f s, qs) and C
s
(Y, f s, qs), respectively.
Given q¯1s and Y
0 = Y
0
, we have Y 1 = c
s
1(Y
0, q¯1s , f
s(1)) = Y1 by the construction of C
s
.
Moreover, r1 = r1 and q
2
s(r1) = q
2
s(r1).
Suppose that for all j ∈ {2, ..., k−1} we have Yj = Y j . We need to show that it holds for group
of slots k, i.e., Yk = Y k. Since the chosen set is the same in every group from 1 to k−1 under C(·)
and C(·), the number of remaining slots in each group is the same as well. Then, the dynamic
capacity of the group of slots k are the same under choice procedures Cs(Y, f s, qs) and C
s
(Y, f s, qs),
i.e., qks (r1, ..., rk−1) = q
k
s(r1, ..., rk−1). Since there are no two contracts of an agent chosen by
C
s
(Y, f s, qs), one can deduce that all of the remaining contracts of agents, whose contracts were
chosen by previous sub-choice functions, are rejected by csk(Y
k−1
, qks(r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(k)). Therefore,
the IRC of the sub-choice function implies that
csk(Y
k−1
, qks(r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(k)) = csk(Y
k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(k)).
Hence, we have Y k = Yk, rk = rk, and q
k+1
s (r1, ..., rk) = q
k+1
s (r1, ..., rk).
Since in each group of slots the same sets of contracts are chosen by the dynamic reserve choice
function and its completion, the result follows.
Proposition 2. C
s
(·) satisfies the IRC.
Proof. For any Y ⊆ X such that Y 6= C
s
(Y, f s, qs), let x be one of the rejected contracts, i.e.,
x ∈ Y \ C
s
(Y, f s, qs). To show that the IRC is satisfied, we need to prove that
C
s
(Y, f s, qs) = C
s
(Y \ {x}, f s, qs).
Let Y˜ = Y \ {x}. Let (Y j, r¯j, Y
j
) be the sequence of the set of chosen contracts, the number
of vacant slots, and the remaining set of contracts for group j = 1, ..., λs from Y under C(·).
Similarly, let (Y˜j, r˜j, Y˜
j) be the sequence of the set of chosen contracts, the number of vacant slots,
and the remaining set of contracts for group j = 1, ..., λs from Y˜ under C(·).
For the first group of slots, since the sub-choice functions satisfy the IRC, we have Y 1 = Y˜1.
Moreover, r¯1 = r˜1 and Y
1
\ {x} = Y˜ 1. By induction, for each j = 2, ..., k − 1, assume that
Y j = Y˜j, r¯j = r˜j, and Y
j
\ {x} = Y˜ j.
We need to show that the above equalities hold for j = k. Since , x /∈ C
s
(Y, f s, qs) and the
sub-choice functions satisfy the IRC condition we have
csk(Y
k−1
, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(k)) = csk(Y˜
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), f
s(k)).
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The same set of contracts is chosen for group k in the choice processes beginning with Y and
Y ∪ {x}, respectively. By our inductive assumption that r¯j = r˜j for each j = 2, ..., k − 1, the
dynamic capacity of group k is the same under both choice processes. The number of remaining
slots is the same as well, i.e., r¯k = r˜k. Finally, we know that x is chosen from the set Y˜
k−1 ∪ {x},
then we have
Y
k
= Y˜ k ∪ {x}.
Since for all j ∈ {1, ..., λs}, Y j = Y˜j, we have C
s
(Y, f s, qs) = C
s
(Y˜ , f s, qs). Hence, C
s
(·, f s, qs)
satisfies the IRC.
Proposition 3. C
s
(·) satisfies the substitutability.
Proof. Consider an offer set Y ⊆ X such that Y 6= C
s
(Y, f s, qs). Let x be one of the rejected
contracts, i.e., x ∈ Y \ C
s
(Y, f s, qs), and let z be an arbitrary contract in X \ Y . To show
substitutability, we need to show that
x /∈ C
s
(Y ∪ {z}, f s, qs).
Consider Y˜ = Y ∪ {z}. Let (Yj, rj, Y
j) be the sequence of the set chosen contracts, the number of
vacant slots, and the set of remaining contracts for group of slots j = 1, ..., λs from Y under C(·).
Similarly, let (Y˜j, r˜j, Y˜
j) be the sequence of the set chosen contracts, the number of vacant slots,
and the set of remaining contracts for group of slots j = 1, ..., λs from Y˜ under C(·). There are
two cases to consider:
Case 1 z ∈ Y˜ \ C
s
(Y˜ , f s, qs).
In this case, the IRC of C
s
implies C
s
(Y˜ , f s, qs) = C
s
(Y, f s, qs). Therefore, x /∈ C
s
(Y˜ , f s, qs).
Case 2 z ∈ C
s
(Y˜ , f s, qs).
Let j be the group of slots such that z ∈ Y˜j. By the IRC of sub-choice functions, x /∈ Y˜j = Yj,
for all j
′
= 1, ..., j − 1. Moreover, Y˜ j
′
−1 = Y j
′
−1 ∪ {z} and r˜j′ = rj′ , for all j
′
= 1, ..., j − 1.
First note that the dynamic capacity of group j is the same under choice procedures beginning
with Y = Y 0 and Y ∪ {z} = Y˜ 0, respectively. This is because the number of unused slots from
groups 1 to j− 1 are the same under the two choice procedures. We know that z is chosen exactly
at group j in the process beginning with Y˜ 0. There are two cases here:
(a) The dynamic capacity of group j is exhausted in the process beginning with Y 0. In this
case, by choosing z from Y˜ 0 another contract, we say that say y ∈ Y˜ 0 is rejected even though y
was chosen at group j in the process beginning with Y 0.
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(b) The dynamic capacity of group j is not exhausted in the choice process beginning with Y 0.
In this case, z is chosen at group j in the process beginning with Y˜ 0 without rejecting any contract
that was chosen in the process beginning with Y 0 at group j.
In the case of (a),
| csj(Y
j−1, qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), f
s(j)) |= qjs(r1, ..., rj−1)
and
z ∈ csj(Y˜
j−1, qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), f
s(j))
implies that there exists a contract y such that
y ∈ csj(Y
j−1, qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), f
s(j)) \ csj(Y˜
j−1, qjs(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1), f
s(j)).
This implies that Y˜ j = Y j ∪ {y}. Since the capacity of group j is exhausted under both choice
processes, the number of vacant slots for group j will be 0 in both choice processes. Thus, the
capacity will be the same for group j + 1 under both.
Notice that
x /∈ Yj =⇒ x /∈ Y˜j
because
csj(Y
j−1, qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), f
s(j)) ∪ {z} \ {y} = csj(Y˜
j−1, qjs(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1), f
s(j)).
In case (b), we have
| csj(Y
j−1, qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), f
s(j)) |< qjs(r1, ..., rj−1).
Hence, rj > 0. Then, since the sub-choice functions are responsive, we have
csj(Y˜
j−1, qjs(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1), f
s(j)) = {z} ∪ csj(Y
j−1, qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), f
s(j)).
Therefore,
x /∈ Yj =⇒ x /∈ Y˜j .
We also have rj = r˜j+1. Moreover, the set of remaining contracts under both choice processes will
be the same, i.e., Y˜ j = Y j . The facts rj′ = r˜j′ for all j
′
= 1, ..., j − 1 and rj = r˜j + 1 implies—by
the monotonicity of capacity transfer schemes—that either
qj+1s (r1, ..., rj) = q
j+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜j)
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or
qj+1s (r1, ..., rj) = 1 + q
j+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜j)
hold.
Suppose now that for all γ = j, ..., k − 1 we have that either
[
Y˜ γ = Y γ ∪ {y˜} for some y˜ and qγ+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜γ) = q
γ+1
s (r1, ..., rγ)
]
or [
Y˜ γ = Y γ and qγ+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜γ) ≤ q
γ+1
s (r1, ..., rγ) ≤ 1 + q
γ+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜γ)
]
.
We have already shown that it holds for γ = j and we will now show that it also holds for
γ = k.
We will first analyze the former case. By inductive assumption, we have Y˜ k−1 = Y k−1 ∪ {y˜}
for some contract y˜. If y˜ is not chosen from the set Y˜ k−1 then exactly the same set of contracts
will be chosen from Y k−1 and Y˜ k−1 since the capacities of group k are the same under both choice
processes and the sub-choice function satisfies the IRC condition. Then, we will have Y˜ k = Y k∪{y˜}.
Moreover, since the number of vacant slots at group k will be the same under both processes, we
will have qk+1s (r1, ..., rj) = q
k+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜j). If y˜ is chosen from the set Y˜
k−1, we have two sub-cases,
depending on if the dynamic capacity of group k is exhausted under the choice process beginning
with Y 0. If it is not exhausted, then we will have
csk(Y˜
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), f
s(k)) = {y˜} ∪ csk(Y
k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(k)),
which implies that Y˜ k = Y k. Moreover, we will have rk = r˜k + 1. The monotonicity of capacity
transfer scheme implies that
qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k) ≤ q
k+1
s (r1, ..., rk) ≤ 1 + q
k+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k).
The first inequality follows from the fact that r˜i ≤ ri for all i = 1, ..., k. The second inequality
follows from the second condition of the monotonicity of the capacity transfer schemes.
On the other hand, if the dynamic capacity of group k is exhausted in the choice procedure
beginning with Y 0, then choosing y˜ from the set Y˜ k−1 implies that there exists a contract y that is
chosen from Y k−1 but rejected from Y˜ k−1. Then, we will have Y˜ k = Y k ∪ {y} since the sub-choice
function is q-responsive and group k’s capacities are the same under both choice processes. In this
case, we will have rk = r˜k = 0. Since r˜i ≤ ri for all i = 1, ..., k, we will have q
k+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k) ≤
qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) from the first condition of the monotonicity of the capacity transfer scheme. Since
qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1) = q
k
s (r1, ..., rk−1) and r˜k = rk, we will have q
k+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k) ≥ q
k+1
s (r1, ..., rk) by the
second condition of the monotonicity of capacity transfer schemes.23
23In the second condition of the monotonicity of the capacity transfer schemes, if the number of vacant slots is
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We will now analyze the latter case in which we have Y˜ k−1 = Y k−1 and either qks (r1, ..., rk−1) =
qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1) or q
k
s (r1, ..., rk−1) = 1 + q
k
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1).
If qks (r1, ..., rk−1) = q
k
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), then given that Y˜
k−1 = Y k−1, we will have Y˜ k = Y k. This
also implies rk = r˜k. Moreover, we obtain q
k+1
s (r1, ..., rk) = q
k+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k) by the monotonic-
ity of capacity transfer scheme. Note that r˜i ≤ ri for all i = 1, ..., k implies q
k+1
s (r1, ..., rk) ≥
qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k) by the first condition of the monotonicity of capacity transfers. The second condi-
tion of the monotonicity of capacity transfers implies qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) ≤ q
k+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k).
If qks (r1, ..., rk−1) = 1 + q
k
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), then given Y˜
k−1 = Y k−1, we have two sub-cases here.
Sub-case 1. If
csk(Y˜
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), f
s(k)) = csk(Y
k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(k)),
then we will have Y˜ k = Y k. Also, the monotonicity of capacity transfer scheme implies that
qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k) ≤ q
k+1
s (r1, ..., rk) ≤ 1 + q
k+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k).
Sub-case 2. If
csk(Y˜
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), f
s(k)) ∪ {y∗} = csk(Y
k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(k))
for some y∗, then we will have Y˜ k = Y k∪{y∗}. Moreover, the monotonicity of capacity transfer
schemes in this case implies that
qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) = q
k+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k).
This is because given r˜i ≤ ri for all i = 1, ..., k the first condition of the monotonicity of the capacity
transfers implies that qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) ≥ q
k+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k). On the other hand, the second condition of
the monotonicity of the capacity transfers implies that qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) ≤ q
k+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k).
Since x /∈ Yk, we will have x /∈ Y˜k for all k = 1, ..., λs. Thus, we can conclude that x /∈
C
s
(Y ∪ {z}, f s, qs), which tells us that the completion C
s
satisfies the substitutability condition.
Proposition 4. C
s
(·) satisfies the LAD.
written as the dynamic capacity of the group minus the number of chosen contracts then we will have the following:
the dynamic capacity of the group k+1 in the choice process beginning with Y minus the dynamic capacity of the
group k+1 in the choice process beginning with Y ∪ {z} = Y˜ 0 must be less than or equal to the summation of the
difference of the number of chosen contracts from group 1 to group k, which is 0 in this specific case.
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Proof. Consider two sets of contracts Y and Y˜ such that Y ⊆ Y˜ ⊆ X. Let f s and qs be the
precedence sequence and the capacity transfer scheme of school s ∈ S. We want to show that
| C
s
(Y, fs, qs) |≤| C
s
(Y˜ , f s, qs) | .
Let (Yj, rj, Y
j) be the sequences of sets of chosen contracts, numbers of vacant slots and sets
of remaining contracts for groups j = 1, ..., λs under choice processes beginning with Y = Y
0.
Similarly, let (Y˜j, r˜j, Y˜
j) be the sequences of sets of chosen contracts, numbers of vacant slots and
sets of remaining contracts for groups j = 1, ..., λs under choice processes beginning with Y˜
0 = Y˜ .
For the first group with capacity q1s, since the sub-choice function is q-responsive (and thus
implies the LAD), we have
| Y1 |=| c
s
1(Y
0, q1s, f
s(1)) |≤| cs1(Y˜
0, q1s, f
s(1)) |=| Y˜1 | .
Then, it implies that r1 = q
1
s− | Y1 |≥ r˜1 = q
1
s− | Y˜1 |. Moreover, we have Y
1 ⊆ Y˜ 1. To see this,
consider a y ∈ Y 1. It means that y /∈ Y1. If y is not chosen from a smaller set Y
0, then it cannot
be chosen from a larger set Y˜ 0 because sub-choice function is q-responsive (hence, substitutable).
Suppose that r˜j ≤ rj and Y
j ⊆ Y˜ j hold for all j = 1, ..., k − 1. We need to show that both of
them hold for group k.
Given that r˜j ≤ rj for all j = 1, ..., k − 1, the first condition of the monotonicity implies that
qks (r1, ..., rk−1) ≥ q
k
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1). The second condition of the monotonicity puts an upper bound
for the difference between qks (r1, ..., rk−1) and q
k
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1). For group k
| Yk | − | Y˜k |≤| Yk | − | c
s
k(Y
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1, f
s(k)) |
because
| Y˜k |=| c
s
k(Y˜
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), f
s(k)) |≥| csk(Y
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), f
s(k)) |
by the q-responsiveness of the sub-choice function. We then have
| Yk | − | c
s
k(Y
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1, f
s(k)) |≤ qks (r1, ..., rk−1)− q
k
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1).
This follows from q-responsiveness because | Yk | − | c
s
k(Y
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1, f
s(k)) | is the dif-
ference between the number of chosen contracts when the capacity is (weakly) increased from
qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1) to q
k
s (r1, ..., rk−1). Hence, the difference | Yk | − | c
s
k(Y
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1, f
s(k)) |
cannot exceed the increase in the capacity which is qks (r1, ..., rk−1)−q
k
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1). Therefore, now
we have
| Yk | − | Y˜k |≤ q
k
s (r1, ..., rk−1)− q
k
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1).
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Rearranging gives us
qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)− | Y˜k |≤ q
k
s (r1, ..., rk−1)− | Yk |,
which is r˜k ≤ rk.
Given that Y k−1 ⊆ Y˜ k−1 and qks (r1, ..., rk−1) ≥ q
k
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), we will have Y
k ⊆ Y˜ k. For an
explanation, consider a contract x ∈ Y k. That means that x ∈ Y k−1 but x is not chosen from Y k−1
when the capacity is qks (r1, ..., rk−1), i.e., x /∈ c
s
k(Y
k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(x)). When the capacity is
reduced to qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1) and the set Y
k−1 is expanded to Y˜ k−1, x cannot be chosen because the
sub-choice function is q-responsive. Hence, it must be the case that x ∈ Y˜ k.
Now let ηj = rj − r˜j. As we just proved above, ηj ≥ 0 for all j = 1, ..., λs. Plugging rj =
qjs(r1, ..., rj−1)− | Yj | and r˜j = q
k
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)− | Y˜j | in ηj = rj − r˜j gives us
| Y˜j |= q
j
s(r1, ..., rj−1)− q
j
s(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)+ | Y
j | +ηj .
Summing both the right and left hand sides for j = 1, ..., λs yields
λs∑
j=1
| Y˜j |=
λs∑
j=1
| Yj | +
λs∑
j=2
[
qjs(r1, ..., rj−1)− q
j
s(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)
]
+
λs∑
j=1
ηj .
Since each ηj ≥ 0, we have
λs∑
j=1
| Y˜j |≥
λs∑
j=1
| Yj | +
λs∑
j=2
[
qjs(r1, ..., rj−1)− q
j
s(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)
]
.
Also, we know that qjs(r1, ..., rj−1) ≥ q
j
s(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1) for all j = 2, ..., λs by the first condition of the
monotonicity of the capacity transfer scheme as, ri ≥ r˜i for all i = 1, ..., j − 1 (Notice that for
j = 1, the capacity is fixed to q1s under both processes.) Therefore, we have
λs∑
j=1
| Y˜j |≥
λs∑
j=1
| Yj |,
which means | C
s
(Y, f s, qs) |≤| C
s
(Y˜ , f s, qs) |.
8.3 Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1
In Proposition 1 we showed that each dynamic reserve choice function has a completion. Propo-
sitions 2 and 3 show that the completion satisfies the IRC and substitutability conditions, respec-
tively. Then, by Theorem 2 of Hatfield and Kominers (2019), there exists a stable outcome with
respect to the profile of schools’ choice functions.
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Proof of Theorem 2
In Proposition 4 we showed that the substitutable completion satisfies the LAD. Then, by the
Theorem 3 of Hatfield and Kominers (2019), the COM is (weakly) group strategy-proof for stu-
dents.
Proof of Theorem 3
Assume, toward a contradiction, that the COM does not respect unambiguous improvements.
Then, there exists a student i ∈ I, a preference profile of students P ∈ ×i∈IP
i, and priority
profiles Π and Π such that Π is an unambiguous improvement over Π for student i and
ϕi(P ; Π)P
iϕi(P ; Π).
Let ϕi(P ; Π) = x and ϕi(P ; Π) = x. Consider a preference P˜
i of student i according to which the
only acceptable contract is x, i.e., P˜ i : x−∅i. Let P˜ = (P˜
i, P−i). We will first prove the following
claim:
Claim: ϕi(P˜ ; Π) = x =⇒ ϕi(P˜ ; Π) = x.
Proof of the Claim: Consider the outcome of the COM under priority profile Π given the
preference profile of students P˜ . Recall that the order in which students make offers has no impact
on the outcome of the COP. We can thus completely ignore student i and run the COP until it
stops. Let Y be the resulting set of contracts. At this point, student i makes an offer for his only
contract x. This might create a chain of rejections, but it does not reach student i. So, his contract
x is chosen by s(x) by, say, the group k with respect to the precedence sequence f s(x) of school
s(x). Now consider the COP under priority profile Π. Again, we completely ignore student i and
run the COP until it stops. The same outcome Y is obtained, because the only difference between
the two COPs is student i’s position in the priority rankings. At this point, student i makes an
offer for his only contract x. If x is chosen by the same group k, then the same rejection chain (if
there was one in the COP under the priority profile Π) will occur and it does not reach student i;
otherwise, we would have a contradiction with the case under priority profile Π. The only other
possibility is the following: since student i’s ranking is now (weakly) better under πs(x) compared
to πs(x), his contract x might be chosen by group l < k. Then, it must be the case that rl = 0
in the COP under both priority profiles Π and Π. Therefore, by selecting x, the group l must
reject some other contract. Let us call this contract y. If no contract of student i(y) = j is chosen
between groups l and k, then, by the q-responsiveness of sub-choice functions, the groups’ chosen
sets between l and k under both priority profiles are the same. Hence, the number of remaining
slots would be the same. In this case, y is chosen in the group k. Thus, if a rejection chain starts,
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it will not reach student i; otherwise, we could have a contradiction due to the fact that x was
chosen at the end of the COP under priority profile Π. A different contract of student j cannot
be chosen between groups l and k; otherwise, the observable substitutability24 of dynamic reserves
choice function of school s(x) would be violated. Therefore, if any contract of student j is chosen
by these groups between l and k, it must be y. If y is chosen by a group that precedes k, then it
must replace a contract—we call it z. By the same reasoning, no other contract of student i(z)
can be chosen before group k; otherwise, we would violate the observable substitutability of the
dynamic reserve choice function of school s(x). Proceeding in this fashion leads the same contract
in group k to be rejected and initiates the same rejection chain that occurs under priority profile
Π. Since the same rejection chain does not reach student i under priority profile Π, it will not
reach student i under priority profile Π, which ends our proof for the claim.
Since ϕi(P ; Π) = x and ϕi(P ; Π) = x such that xP
ix, if student i misreports and submits P˜ i
under priority profile Π , then she can successfully manipulate the COM. This is a contradiction
because we have already established that the COM is strategy-proof.
Proof of Theorem 4
Consider school s ∈ S with a precedence sequence f s and a target capacity vector (q1s, ..., q
λs
s ). Let
q˜s and qs be two capacity transfer schemes that are compatible with the precedence sequence f
s
and the target capacity vector (q1s, ..., q
λs
s ). Suppose that the following two conditions hold:
• there exists l ∈ {2, ..., λs} and (rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1) ∈ Zl−1+ , such that q˜
l
s(rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1) = 1+q
l
s(rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1),
and
• for all j ∈ {2, ..., λs} and (r1, ..., rj−1) ∈ Z
j−1
+ , if j 6= l or (r1, ..., rj−1) 6= (rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1), then
q˜js(r1, ..., rj−1) = q
j
s(r1, ..., rj−1).
Let C˜s and Cs be dynamic reserves choice functions C˜s(·, f s, q˜s) and C
s(·, f s, qs), respectively. Let
C˜ =
(
C˜s, C−s
)
and C = (Cs, C−s). Let the outcomes of the cumulative offer algorithm at
(
P, C˜
)
and (P,C) be Z˜ and Z, respectively. If Z˜ = Z, then there is nothing to prove because it means
the capacity flexibility of school s does not bite.
Suppose that Z˜ 6= Z. That is, the capacity flexibility of school s bites, which means that there
is a student who was rejected under Cs who is no longer rejected under C˜s. We now define an
improvement chains algorithm that starts with outcome Z. Since the capacity flexibility bites, the
vector (rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1) must occur in the choice procedure of school s.
24Dynamic reserves choice functions satisfy observable substitutability condition of Hatfield et al. (2019). We
refer readers to Hatfield et al. (2019) for the definitions of observable offer processes and observable substitutability.
Since dynamic reserves choice functions have substitutable completion that satisfies the size monotonicity, it satisfies
observable substitutability.
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Step 1: Consider students who prefer (s, f s(l)) to their assignments under Z, i.e.,
I˜
(s,fs(l))
1 = {i ∈ I | (s, f
s(l))P iZi}.
We choose πs-maximal student in I˜
(s,fs(l))
1 (if any), call her i˜1, and assign her x˜1 = (˜i1, s, f
s(l)).
Update the outcome to Z˜1 = Z ∪ {x˜1} \ z1 where z1 is the contract student i˜1 receives under Z.
If (s(z1), t(z1)) = ∅, then the improvement process ends and we have Z˜ = Z˜1 = Z ∪ {x˜1}.
Otherwise, we move to Step 2 because by assigning i˜1 to (s, f
s(l)) we create a vacancy in school
s(z1) within the privilege t(z1).
If I˜
(s,fs(l))
1 = ∅, then the number of vacant slots at the last group accepting students in type
f s(l) will increase by one. When the capacity transfer scheme of school s does not transfer this
extra vacancy to any other group following the last group in type f s(l) in the computation of
Cs(Zs, f
s, q˜s), the improvement chain process ends and we have Z˜ = Z. If the extra slot is trans-
ferred to the group l
′
that follows the last group in type f s(l) in the computation of Cs(Zs, f
s, q˜s),
then we consider students who prefer (s, f s(l
′
)) over their assignments under Z, i.e.,
I
(s,fs(l
′
))
1 = {i ∈ I | (s, f
s(l
′
))P iZi}.
We choose πs-maximal student in I
(s,fs(l
′
))
1 (if there is any), call her i˜1, and assign her x˜1 =
(˜i1, s, f
s(l
′
)). Update the outcome to Z˜1 = Z ∪ {x˜1} \ z1 where z1 is the contract i˜1 receives under
Z.
If (s(z1), t(z1)) = ∅, then the improvement process ends and we have Z˜ = Z˜1 = Z ∪ {x˜1}.
Otherwise, we move to Step 2. Because assigning i˜1 to (s, f
s(l
′
)) creates a vacancy in school s(z1)
within the privilege t(z1).
If I˜
(s,fs(l
′
))
1 = ∅, then the number of vacant slots at the last group that accepts students in type
f s(l
′
) will increase by one. If the capacity transfer scheme of school s does not transfer this extra
vacancy to any other group following the last group that accepts students of type f s(l
′
) in the
computation of Cs(Zs, f
s, q˜s), then the improvement chain process ends and we have Z˜ = Z. If
the extra slot is transferred to the group l
′′
that follows the last group that accepts students in
type f s(l
′
) in the computation of Cs(Zs, f
s, q˜s), then we consider students who prefer (s, f
s(l
′′
))
over their assignments under Z, and so on.
Since school s has finitely many groups, Step 1 ends in finitely many iterations. If no extra
student is assigned to school s by the end of Step 1, then the improvement chains algorithm ends
and we have Z˜ = Z. If an extra student is assigned to school s by the end of Step 1, then we move
on to Step 2.
Step t>1: Consider students who prefer (s(zt−1), t(zt−1)) to their assignments under Z˜t−1, i.e.,
I˜
(s(zt−1),t(zt−1))
t = {i ∈ I | (s(zt−1), t(zt−1))P
i(Z˜t−1)i}.
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We choose πs(zt−1)-maximal student in I˜
(s(zt−1),t(zt−1))
t , call her i˜t, and assign her x˜t = (˜it, s(zt−1), t(zt−1)).
Update the outcome to Z˜t = Z˜t−1∪{x˜t}\zt where zt is the contract student i˜t receives under Z˜t−1.
If (s(zt−1), t(zt−1)) = ∅, then the improvement algorithm ends and we have Z˜ = Z˜t = Z˜t−1 ∪
{x˜t}. Otherwise, we move to Step t+1. Because assigning i˜t to (s(zt−1), t(zt−1)) creates a vacancy
in school s(zt) within type t(zt).
If I˜
(s(zt−1),t(zt−1))
t = ∅, then the number of vacant slots at the last group that accepts students
in type f s(zt−1) will increase by one. If the capacity transfer scheme of school s(zt−1) does not
transfer this extra capacity to any other group following the last group that accepts students
in type t(zt−1) in the computation of C
s(zt−1)((Z˜t−1)s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1), qs(zt−1)), then the improvement
chains process ends and we have Z˜ = Z˜t−1. If the extra slot is transferred to the group of
slot m that follows the last group that accepts students in type t(zt−1) in the computation of
Cs(zt−1)((Z˜t−1)s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1), qs(zt−1)), then we consider students who prefer (s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1)(m))
over their assignments under Z˜t−1, i.e.,
I˜
(s(zt−1),f
s(zt−1)(m))
t = {i ∈ I | (s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1)(m))P i(Z˜t−1)i}.
We choose πs(zt−1)-maximal student in I˜
(s(zt−1),f
s(zt−1)(m))
t , call her i˜t, and assign her x˜t = (˜it, s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1)(m)).
Update the outcome to Z˜t = Z˜t−1∪{x˜t}\zt where zt is the contract student i˜t receives under Z˜t−1.
If (s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1)(m)) = ∅, then the improvement algorithm ends and we have Z˜ = Z˜t =
Z˜t−1∪{x˜t}. Otherwise, we move to Step t+1. Because assigning i˜t to (s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1)(m)) creates
a vacancy in school s(zt) within type t(zt).
If I˜
(s(zt−1),t(zt−1))
t = ∅, then the number of vacant slots at the last group that accepts students
in type f s(zt−1) will increase by one. If the capacity transfer scheme of school s(zt−1) does not
transfer this extra capacity to any other group following the last group that accepts students in
type f s(zt−1)(m) in the computation of Cs(zt−1)((Z˜t−1)s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1), qs(zt−1)), then the improvement
chains process ends and we have Z˜ = Z˜t−1. If the extra slot is transferred to the group of slot
m
′
that follows the last group that accepts students in type f s(zt−1)(m) in the computation of
Cs(zt−1)((Z˜t−1)s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1), qs(zt−1)), then we consider students who prefer (s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1)(m
′
))
over their assignments under Z˜t−1, and so on.
Since school s(zt−1) has finitely many groups , Step t ends in finitely many iterations. If no
extra student is assigned to school s(zt−1) by the end of Step t, then the improvement chains
algorithm ends and we have Z˜ = Z˜t−1. If an extra student is assigned to school s(zt−1) by the end
of Step t, then we move on to Step t+ 1.
This process ends in finitely many iterations because there are finitely many contracts and
when we move to the next step it means a student is made strictly better off. Also, notice that no
student is worse off during the execution of the improvement chains algorithm. The improvement
algorithm, by construction, starts with the outcome Φ(P,C) and ends at Φ(P, C˜). Hence, we have
Φi(P, C˜)R
iΦi(P,C) for all i ∈ I.
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We define the sequence of capacity transfer schemes and dynamic reserve choice functions
for school s ∈ S: ((qs)
1, (qs)
2, ...) and (Cs(Y, f s, (qs)
1), Cs(Y, f s, (qs)
2), ...). Let the sequence
Φ(P,C1), Φ(P,C2),... denote the outcomes of the COPs at profiles (P, (Cs(·, f s, (qs)
1), C−s)) and
(P, (Cs(·, f s, (qs)
2), C−s)),..., respectively. Hence, by construction, we have Φi(P,C
a+1)RiΦi(P,C
a)
for all i ∈ I and a ≥ 1. By the transitivity of weak preferences, we have Φi(P, C˜)R
iΦ(P,C) for all
i ∈ I.
Proof of Theorem 5
Our proof is constructive. We first define an associated type space. Let X be the set of all
contracts. We define a distinct “type” for each contract in X. Let g : X → T = {τ1, ..., τ|X|} be
a bijective function. The interpretation of the g function is that the artificial type of a contract
x ∈ X is g(x) ∈ {τ1, ..., τ|X|}. Therefore, each contract in X is associated with a distinct (artificial)
type.
Consider a slot bl ∈ Bs with priority order π
bl. Let | πbl | denote the number of contracts that
the slot bl finds acceptable, i.e., ranks higher than the null contract which corresponds to remaining
unassigned. Let x1l , x
2
l ,...,x
|pibl |
l be the acceptable contracts for slot bl such that
x1l π
blx2l π
bl · · ·πblx
|pibl |
l .
For the slot bl in school s in the true market, we create a sequence of slots—| π
bl | many slots— in
the associated market, i.e., {b1l , ...b
|pibl |
l }. The initial capacity of b
1
l is 1, i.e., qb1l = 1, and the initial
capacities of b2l , b
3
l , ..., b
|pibl |
l are 0, i.e., qbkl = 0 for all k = 2, ..., | π
bl |. Define rbk
l
such that rbk
l
= 0
if slot bkl is filled and rbkl = 1 if slot b
k
l remains vacant. The dynamic capacity of the slot b
k
l , for all
k = 2, ..., | πbl |, is defined as qbk
l
(rb1
l
, ..., rbk−1
l
) = rbk−1
l
. That is, if the slot bk−1l remains vacant, then
the capacity of the slot bkl becomes 1. Note that if a slot b
k−1
l is filled, then the dynamic capacity
of slots that come after bk−1l become 0.
Each slot bkl is associated with a sub-choice rule c
s
bk
l
(·, qbk
l
, ·) that is defined as follows: The
sub-choice rule cs
bk
l
(·, qbk
l
, ·) can only considers contracts with artificial type g−1(xkl ), therefore only
the contract xkl . Given a set of contracts Y ⊆ X,
cs
bk
l
(Y, qbk
l
, g−1(xkl )) =

 {x
k
l }
∅
if xkl ∈ Y and qbkl = 1,
otherwise
.
Note that cs
bk
l
is a q-responsive choice function. We now describe a dynamic reserves choice rule
C˜s(·) that is outcome equivalent to the slot-specific choice rule Cs(·). Let Y ⊆ X be a set of
contracts.
Step 1 Consider slots {b11, b
2
1, ..., b
|pib1 |
1 } in this step.
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Step 1.1 Apply the sub-choice function cs
b11
. If a contract is chosen, then end Step 1, and
move to Step 2 due to the capacity transfer rule described above. Otherwise, move to Step 1.2.
Step 1.2 Apply the sub-choice function cs
b21
. If a contract is chosen, then end Step 1, and
move to Step 2 due to the capacity transfer rule described above. Otherwise, move to Step 1.3.
This process continues in sequence. If a contract chosen in Step 1, then all of the contracts
associated with the student whose contract is chosen is removed for the rest of the procedure. Let
y1 be the chosen contract in this step. Then, the set of remaining contracts is Y \ Yi(y1).
Step n ≥ 2 Consider slots {b1n, b
2
n, ..., b
|pibn |
n } in this step.
Step n.1 Apply the sub-choice function cs
b1n
. If a contract is chosen, then end Step n, and
move to Step (n + 1) due to the capacity transfer rule described above. Otherwise, move to Step
n.2.
Step n.2 Apply the sub-choice function cs
b2n
. If a contract is chosen, then end Step n, and
move to Step (n + 1) due to the capacity transfer rule described above. Otherwise, move to Step
n.3.
This process continues in sequence. If a contract chosen in Step n, then all of the contracts
associated with the student whose contract is chosen is removed for the rest of the procedure. Let
yn be the chosen contract in this step. Then, the set of remaining contracts is Y \ Yi(y1,...,yn).
By construction, for any given set of contracts Y ⊆ X, for each slot bl in the process of the
slot-specific priorities choice function Cs(·) and Step l of the dynamic reserves choice function C˜s(·)
the set of available contracts, and hence, the chosen contract are the same. Therefore, these two
choice functions select the same set of contracts, i.e., Cs(Y ) = C˜s(Y ). This ends our proof.
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